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AWS Secrets Manager helps you protect the secrets that are needed to access your applications, services, and IT resources. With this service, you can rotate, manage, and retrieve database credentials, API keys, OAuth tokens, and other secrets throughout their lifecycle. The secret value rotation feature has built-in integration for services like Amazon Relational Database Service (Amazon RDS) , whose credentials can be rotated. The same integration functionality can also be extended to other types of secrets, including API keys and OAuth tokens, with the help of AWS Lambda functions.
This blog post provides details on how Secrets Manager can be used to store and rotate the admin password of AWS Directory Service at a specified frequency. Customers who use the directory services in AWS can deploy the solution in this blog post to minimize the effort spent by their operations team to manually rotate the password (which is one of the best practices of password management). These customers can also benefit by using the secure API access of Secrets Manager to allow access by applications that are using Active Directory–specific accounts. A good example is having an application to reset passwords for AD users and can be done using the API access.
When you configure AWS Directory Service, one of the inputs the service expects is the password for the admin user (administrator). By using an AWS Lambda function and Secrets Manager, you can store the password and rotate it periodically.
Figure 1 shows the architecture diagram for this solution.
The workflow is as follows:
During initial setup (which can be performed either manually or through a CloudFormation template), the password of the admin user is stored as a secret in Secrets Manager. The secret is in the JSON format and contains three fields: Directory ID, UserName, and Password. The secret is encrypted using KMS Key to provide an added layer of security.
This secret is attached to a Lambda function that controls rotation.
This rotation Lambda function generates a new password, updates Active Directory, and then updates the secret. The function can be invoked on as-needed basis or at a desired interval. The CFN template we provide in this post schedules the rotation at a 30-day interval.
Applications can securely fetch the new secret value from Secrets Manager.
Prerequisites and assumptions
To implement this solution, you need an AWS account to test the solution and access AWS services.
Also be aware of the following:
In this solution, you will configure all the (supported) services in the same virtual private cloud (VPC) to simplify networking considerations.
The predefined admin user name for Simple Active Directory is Administrator.
The predefined password is a random 12-character string.
Important: The AWS CloudFormation template that we provide deploys a Simple Active Directory. This is for testing and demonstration purposes; you can modify or reuse the solution for other types of Active Directory solutions.
Deploy the solution
To deploy the solution, you first provision the baseline networking and other resources by using a CloudFormation stack.
The resource provisioning in this step creates these resources:
An Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (Amazon VPC) with two private subnets
AWS Directory Service installed and configured in the VPC
A Secrets Manager secret with rotation enabled
A Lambda function inside the VPC
These AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles and permissions:
Secrets Manager has permission to invoke Lambda functions
The Lambda function has permission to update the secret in Secrets Manager
The Lambda function has permission to update the password for Directory Service
To deploy the solution by using the CloudFormation template
You can use this downloadable template to set up the resources. To launch directly through the console, choose the following Launch Stack button, which creates the stack in the us-east-1 AWS Region.
Choose Next to go to the Specify stack details page.
The bucket hosting the Lambda function code is predefined for ease of implementation, but you can edit the bucket name if necessary. Specify any other template details as needed, and then choose Next.
(Optional) On the Configure Stack Options page, enter any tags, and then choose Next.
On the Review page, select the check box for I acknowledge that AWS CloudFormation might create IAM resources with custom names, and choose Create stack.
It takes approximately 20–25 minutes for the provisioning to complete. When the stack status shows Create Complete, review the outputs that were created by navigating to the Outputs tab, as shown in Figure 2.
Now that the stack creation has completed successfully, you should validate the resources that were created.
To validate the resources
Navigate to the AWS Directory Service console. You should see a new directory service that has the corp.com directory set up.
Navigate to the AWS Secrets Manager console and review the secret that was created called DSAdminPswd. Choose the secret value, and then choose Retrieve secret value to reveal the secret values.
As you might have noticed, the secret value changed from what was initially generated in the template. The Lambda function was invoked when it was attached to the secret, which caused the secret to rotate. To verify that the secret value changed, navigate to the Amazon CloudWatch console, and then navigate to Log groups.
In the search bar, type the Lambda function name dj-rotate-lambda to filter on the log group name.
Choose the log group /aws/lambda/dj-rotate-lambda to open the detailed log streams.
Look at the Log streams and open the recent log stream to view the series of rotation events.
You should see that each of the four stages of rotation (create, set, test, and finish) are called in the right sequence. A Success message in the finishSecret stage confirms the successful rotation of the secret value.
The next step is to rotate the secret manually or set a policy for rotation.
To rotate the secret
The CloudFormation automation has set the rotation configuration to rotate the secret every 30 days. You can alternatively initiate another rotation by choosing Rotate secret immediately, as shown in Figure 6. You will observe the log stream (in CloudWatch Logs) changing, followed by the new secret value.
You can also edit the rotation configuration by choosing Edit rotation and configuring the rotation policy that suits your organizational standards, as shown in Figure 7.
The rotation Lambda function works in four stages:
CreateSecret – In this stage, the Lambda function creates a new password for the administrator user and sets up the staging label AWSPENDING for the secret’s new value.
SetSecret – In this stage, the Lambda function fetches the newly generated password by using the label AWSPENDING and sets it as the password to the Active Directory administrator user.
TestSecret – In this stage, the Lambda function verifies that the password is working by using the kinit command and the necessary dependent libraries of the Linux OS (the base OS for Lambda functions). If successful, the function continues to the next stage. In the case of failure, the catch block reverts the password of the Active Directory administrator user to the value in the AWSCURRENT label.
FinishSecret – This is the final stage, where the Lambda function moves the labels AWSCURRENT from the current version of secret to the new version. And the same time, the old version of the secret is given AWSPREVIOUS label.
The Lambda function is written in Python 3.7 runtime and uses AWS SDK for Python (Boto3) API calls for interacting with Secrets Manager and Directory Services.
The directory ID and Secrets Manager endpoint are supplied as environment variables to the Lambda function, as shown in Figure 8. The secret ID is fetched from the event context.
You can download the Lambda code that is used for the rotation logic and modify it to suit your organizational needs. For instance, the random password is configured to have a length of 12 characters, excluding special characters and punctuations, as shown in the following code snippet. You can modify this configuration as needed.
As mentioned in the Prerequisites section, make sure that you do proper testing in development or test environments before proceeding to deploy the solution in production environments.
After you complete and test this solution, clean up the resources by deleting the AWS CloudFormation stack called aws-ds-creds-manager. For more information on deleting the stacks, see Deleting a stack on the AWS CloudFormation console.
In this post, we demonstrated how to use the AWS Secrets Manager service to store and rotate the AWS Directory Service Simple Active Directory admin password. You can also use this solution to rotate the AWS Managed Microsoft AD directory.
There are many other code samples listed in the AWS Code Sample Catalog that show how to rotate the passwords for other database services that are supported by this service.
You can find additional rotation Lambda function examples in the open source AWS library for Secrets Manager.
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AWS Secrets Manager helps you protect the secrets that are needed to access your applications, services, and IT resources. With this service, you can rotate, manage, and retrieve database credentials, API keys, OAuth tokens, and other secrets throughout their lifecycle. The secret value rotation feature has built-in integration for services like Amazon Relational Database ServiceRead More
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The new $30 Airtag tracking device from Apple has a feature that allows anyone who finds one of these tiny location beacons to scan it with a mobile phone and discover its owner’s phone number if the Airtag has been set to lost mode. But according to new research, this same feature can be abused to redirect the Good Samaritan to an iCloud phishing page — or to any other malicious website.
The Airtag’s “Lost Mode” lets users alert Apple when an Airtag is missing. Setting it to Lost Mode generates a unique URL at https://found.apple.com, and allows the user to enter a personal message and contact phone number. Anyone who finds the Airtag and scans it with an Apple or Android phone will immediately see that unique Apple URL with the owner’s message.
When scanned, an Airtag in Lost Mode will present a short message asking the finder to call the owner at at their specified phone number. This information pops up without asking the finder to log in or provide any personal information. But your average Good Samaritan might not know this.
That’s important because Apple’s Lost Mode doesn’t currently stop users from injecting arbitrary computer code into its phone number field — such as code that causes the Good Samaritan’s device to visit a phony Apple iCloud login page.
The vulnerability was discovered and reported to Apple by Bobby Rauch, a security consultant and penetration tester based in Boston. Rauch told KrebsOnSecurity the Airtag weakness makes the devices cheap and possibly very effective physical trojan horses.
“I can’t remember another instance where these sort of small consumer-grade tracking devices at a low cost like this could be weaponized,” Rauch said.
Consider the scenario where an attacker drops a malware-laden USB flash drive in the parking lot of a company he wants to hack into. Odds are that sooner or later some employee is going to pick that sucker up and plug it into a computer — just to see what’s on it (the drive might even be labeled something tantalizing, like “Employee Salaries”).
If this sounds like a script from a James Bond movie, you’re not far off the mark. A USB stick with malware is very likely how U.S. and Israeli cyber hackers got the infamous Stuxnet worm into the internal, air-gapped network that powered Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities a decade ago. In 2008, a cyber attack described at the time as “the worst breach of U.S. military computers in history” was traced back to a USB flash drive left in the parking lot of a U.S. Department of Defense facility.
In the modern telling of this caper, a weaponized Airtag tracking device could be used to redirect the Good Samaritan to a phishing page, or to a website that tries to foist malicious software onto her device.
Rauch contacted Apple about the bug on June 20, but for three months when he inquired about it the company would say only that it was still investigating. A few hours after Apple was contacted by KrebsOnSecurity last Friday, the company sent Rauch a follow-up email stating they planned to address the weakness in an upcoming update, and in the meantime would he mind not talking about it publicly?
Rauch said Apple never acknowledged basic questions he asked about the bug, such as if they had a timeline for fixing it, and if so whether they planned to credit him in the accompanying security advisory. Or whether his submission would qualify for Apple’s “bug bounty” program, which promises financial rewards of up to $1 million for security researchers who report security bugs in Apple products.
Rauch said he’s reported many software vulnerabilities to other vendors over the years, and that Apple’s lack of communication prompted him to go public with his findings — even though Apple says staying quiet about a bug until it is fixed is how researchers qualify for recognition in security advisories.
“I told them, ‘I’m willing to work with you if you can provide some details of when you plan on remediating this, and whether there would be any recognition or bug bounty payout’,” Rauch said, noting that he told Apple he planned to publish his findings within 90 days of notifying them. “Their response was basically, ‘We’d appreciate it if you didn’t leak this.’”
Rauch’s experience echoes that of other researchers interviewed in a recent Washington Post article about how not fun it can be to report security vulnerabilities to Apple, a notoriously secretive company. The common complaints were that Apple is slow to fix bugs and doesn’t always pay or publicly recognize hackers for their reports, and that researchers often receive little or no feedback from the company.
The risk, of course, is that some researchers may decide it’s less of a hassle to sell their exploits to vulnerability brokers, or on the darknet — both of which often pay far more than bug bounty awards.
There’s also a risk that frustrated researchers will simply post their findings online for everyone to see and exploit — regardless of whether the vendor has released a patch. Earlier this week, a security researcher who goes by the handle “illusionofchaos” released writeups on three zero-day vulnerabilities in Apple’s iOS mobile operating system — apparently out of frustration over trying to work with Apple’s bug bounty program.
Ars Technica reports that on July 19 Apple fixed a bug that llusionofchaos reported on April 29, but that Apple neglected to credit him in its security advisory.
“Frustration with this failure of Apple to live up to its own promises led illusionofchaos to first threaten, then publicly drop this week’s three zero-days,” wrote Jim Salter for Ars. “In illusionofchaos’ own words: ‘Ten days ago I asked for an explanation and warned then that I would make my research public if I don’t receive an explanation. My request was ignored so I’m doing what I said I would.’”
Rauch said he realizes the Airtag bug he found probably isn’t the most pressing security or privacy issue Apple is grappling with at the moment. But he said neither is it difficult to fix this particular flaw, which requires additional restrictions on data that Airtag users can enter into the Lost Mode’s phone number settings.
“It’s a pretty easy thing to fix,” he said. “Having said that, I imagine they probably want to also figure out how this was missed in the first place.”
Apple has not responded to requests for comment.
The new $30 Airtag tracking device from Apple has a feature that allows anyone who finds one of these tiny location beacons to scan it with a mobile phone and discover its owner’s phone number if the Airtag has been set to lost mode. But according to new research, this same feature can be abused to redirect the Good Samaritan to an iCloud phishing page — or to any other malicious website.Read More
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Tracked as CVE-2021-26084 (CVSS score: 9.8), the vulnerability concerns an OGNL (Object-Graph Navigation Language) injection flaw thatOpportunistic threat actors have been found actively exploiting a recently disclosed critical security flaw in Atlassian Confluence deployments across Windows and Linux to deploy web shells that result in the execution of crypto miners on compromised systems.
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